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The years 1954 and 1955 have witnessed a sharp clarification of
the tax effects of various forms of gifts to minors.'
Outright Gift
The Internal Revenue Service led the way when it announced
in Revenue Ruling 54-400 that, for purposes of the annual gift tax
exclusion, an "unqualified and unrestricted gift to a minor, with or
without the appointment of a legal guardian, is a gift of a present
interest."'2 By ending the uncertainty as to the availability of the an-
nual gift tax exclusion where no legal guardian has been appointed,
this ruling serves to encourage plans for income tax and estate tax
savings through outright transfers to minors of income-producing prop-
erties.
Gifts of Life Insurance
More recently, the Service gave additional assurances concerning
the annual exclusion when it ruled that gifts of life insurance policies
having no immediate cash value, as well as subsequent payments of pre-
miums thereon, constituted gifts of present interest under the new
Code. 3 This result will prevail so long as (a) the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the policies, (b) he has the "usual incidents of
ownership" including the rights to change the beneficiary and to sur-
render the policy for its cash value, if any, and (c) neither he nor his
guardian is restricted in any manner in the exercise of all of the legal in-
cidents of ownership in the policies.4 The cloud previously formed by
tReprinted by permission from the Proceedings of the New York University
Fourteenth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, published by Matthew Bender
and Co.
*Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
'For a discussion of a variety of methods .for making gifts to minors, see Caplin,
How to Treat Gifts to Minors, Proc. N. Y. U. 13th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation
193 (1955)-
21954-2 CB 319, 320. An outright gift to a minor through his legal or natural
guardian should clearly qualify for the annual exclusion. E.g., Snyder v. United
States, 56-1 USTG paragraph 11,581 (W. D. N. C. 1955); cf. Madeleine N. Sharp,
3 TO io6° (1944), acq., aff'd 153 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1946).
ORev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-26 IRB 32.
'Id. at 33.
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Nashville Trust Co.5 seems to have been dissipated by this single
pronouncement.
Use of Nominee
The income tax consequences resulting from the use of nominees
have also been given needed clarification. Thus, where a donor, intend-
ing to make a gift to a minor, registers the gift property in the name
of an adult nominee, it is now settled that the income from this prop-
erty will be taxed to the infant donee.6 A trust will not be deemed to
have been created; nor will the nominee be subjected to income tax
so long as the gift is bona fide and unequivocal.
Gifts of Securities to Minors Act
We have also seen, under the auspices of the New York Stock Ex-
change, a partial solution of some of the practical problems involved
in outright transfers of securities to minors. A "Gifts of Securities to
Minors Act" has been drafted and adopted by eleven states-California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin. This act provides a
simple legal procedure whereby an adult may make an irrevocable
gift of securities to a minor by simply having the securities registered
in the name of a "custodian," who may be the donor himself or a
close adult relative of the child. Thereafter, by virtue of mere reference
on the stock certificate to the state statutory provision, the custodian is
empowered to retain the securities or to sell them, and to reinvest the
proceeds or to hold them in a savings account. In making investments,
he must be guided by the "prudent man rule." While he may be
reimbursed for expenses, he may not be otherwise compensated, except
where he is the legal guardian of the property of the minor.
7
Widespread adoption of this sensible legislation would eliminate
the unnecessary costs and cumbersome legal procedures which so
frequently characterize this type of gift. However, the coverage of
this act is limited to "securities," thus leaving unanswered the many
problems raised by gifts to minors of realty, other types of personalty,
12 TCM 992 (1943).
6Rev. Rul. 55.469, 1955-30 IRB 34. Also, see Prudence Miller Trust, 7 TC 1245
(1946), acq.
For example, see Colo. Sess. Laws (i955) H. B. No. 265; N. J. Laws (1955)
c. 139; Wis. Laws (1955) c. 507. The Internal Revenue Service has recently ruled
that a gift to a custodian under the Colorado statute qualifies for the exclusion
under IRC § 2503 (c). See Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-11 IRB 11, 1956, CCH Fed. Est.
& Gift Tax Rep. paragraph 8o66.
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cash, and the like.8 Futhermore, within its limited scope, the statute
applies only to outright transfers and does not leave room for more
flexible plans which may be accomplished through other methods of
transferring property.
INCOME TAX SAVINGS
Variations in the manner of disposing of property are most satis-
factorily accomplished during a donor's lifetime through gifts made
to irrevocable inter vivos trusts. Almost every type of property lends
itself to this form of gift; and, where minor beneficiaries are involved,
the trust provides a ready solution to the many practical problems
to be faced.
General Patterns for Income Tax Savings
To the extent that a trust is recognized as a separate taxpayer,
it acts as a convenient method for spreading the family income. Each
trust, as a separate taxpayer, has the potential of being in a lower tax
bracket than the person who is primarily responsible for the family
income. And as the number of trusts is expanded, 9 the likelihood of
securing lower surtax rates is obviously increased. 10
The mere availability of additional related taxpayers enlarges
the potential for shifting and minimizing the total income tax im-
pact. This is particularly applicable in the trust area whenever an
unrelated and independent trustee has been appointed. For it then
becomes possible to strive for tax savings through a variety of business
transactions between the grantor and the trustee, or between the bene-
'See Rogers, Some Practical Considerations in Gifts to Minors (1951) 20 Ford.
L. Rev. 233; also, Shattuck, A Practical Consideration of Some of the Legal and
Tax Problems Inherent in Gifts to Minors (1951) 31 B. U. L. Rev. 451.
'The creation of multiple trusts serves to subdivide further any accumulated
trust income. Where the same instrument provides for the holding of property
in trust, a question of fact often arises as to whether one trust or several trusts
have been created. See United States Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 296 U. S. 481 (1936);
McHarg v. Fitzpatrick, 21o F. (2d) 792 (C. A. 2nd, 1954); Mary E. Fennerty Testa-
mentary Trust, 13 TCM 831 (1954). But cf. IRO § 663(c), treating separate shares
as separate trusts for the sole purpose of determining the amount of "distributable
net income" in the application of IRC §§ 661 and 662. For a general consideration
of the multiple trust problem, see Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act
of 1937 (1937) 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 41, 71-76; Tremper, Single v. Multiple Trusts
0939) 17 Taxes 463; Note, Multiple Trusts and the Minimization of Federal Taxes
(1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 309.
"The multiple trust pattern can prove disadvantageous where one trust oper-
ates at a loss while another produces a gain. See Fred W. Smith, 25 TC No. 22
(1955) (same creator, same trustee and same beneficiary of two separate trusts;
held, single consolidated return may not be filed); cf. Reg. 118 § 39.142-3.
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ficiary and the trustee-such as sales of depreciable property,"1 co-
ownership arrangements, 12 family partnerships, 3 leasebacks14 and
other leasing agreements.' 5
An annual income tax deduction of $300 is allowed for each cur-
rently distributable trust, while all other trusts are limited to a $ioo
deduction.16 In turn, the income beneficiary of the trust is allowed a
personal exemption of 56oo on his individual return;17 and, regardless
"IRO § 1239 will not prevent capital gain treatment in a sale of depreciable
property by a grantor or beneficiary to his trust. Hence, where the seller is willing
to pay the tax on his capital gain, the trust will obtain "two-for-one" treatment
by securing a stepped-up basis for depreciation purposes. In contrast, IRC § 267
denies recognition of any loss in transactions between grantor and trustee, between
trustee and beneficiary, as well as in other similar types of transactions.
"Under co-ownership arrangements, income is usually taxable to the parties in
proportion to their respective interests in the property. E.g., H. D. Webster, 4 TC
1169 (1954), acq. (joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety); Alfred Hafner, 31 BTA
338 (1934), acq. (tenancy in common). However, the co-ownership must be bona fide.
See Lannan v. Kelm, 221 F. (2d) 725, 735-736 (C. A. 8th, 1955). And where losses
are realized, the deduction must be similarly shared. Oren C. White, 18 TC 385
(1952).
'-See IRO § 704(e) and Proposed Reg. § 1.7o4-1(e)(vii); also, Comm'r v. Culbert-
son, 337 U. S. 733, 741 (1949). Where a discretionary trust is recognized to be a
partner, a question may arise whether the income is taxable to the trustee or
to the beneficiary. Cf. Grant v. Nicholas, 127 F. Supp. 236 (D. C. Colo. 1955). On
the other hand, though the partnership is disregarded, income may still be taxable
to the trustee under the co-ownership principle. See Wofford v. Comm'r, 207 F. (2d)
749 (C. A. 5 th, 1953).
"An independent trustee, fair rental terms and other evidence of arm's length
dealing are of key importance in validating a leaseback arrangement. E.g., Skemp
v. Comm'r, 168 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1948); Brown v. Comm'r, 18o F. (2d) 926
(C. A. 3rd, 1950), cert. den. 340 U. S. 814 (1950); Consolidated Apparel Co. v.
Comm'r, 207 F. (2d) 580 (C. A. 7th, 1953); Albert T. Felix, 21 TC 794 (1954). Con-
trariwise, a prearranged leaseback transaction with a related trustee, and involving
an unreasonable rental, would be extremely vulnerable. See Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1
CB 2o; cf. Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F. (2d) 69 (C. A. 9th, 1955), and Brock-
man Building Corp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 55-2 USTC paragraph 9675 (C. A. 9th, 1955).
Also, cf. White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F. (2d) 398 (C. A. 2nd. 1951), cert. den. 343 U. S.
928 (1952)-
"Leasing arrangements involving business realty or equipment may permit,
advantageous income tax deductions for the lessee." However, the courts will often
inquire into whether "the parties in good faith actually intended to enter into a
lease contract," or whether the party claiming the deduction was "taking title" to
the property or had acquired an "equity" therein. Compare Benton v. Comm'r,
197 F. (2d) 745, 752 (C. A. 5 th, 1952) (valid lease), with Oesterreich v. Comm'r, 55-2
USTO 9733 (C. A. 9 th, 1955) (contract of sale). For a recent statement of the
Commissioner's views as to leases of business equipment, see Rev. Rul. 55-540 ,
1955-35 IRB 9; Rev. Rul. 55-541, id. at 6; Rev. Rul. 55-542, id. at 14. Also, cf.
Lukins, Tax Treatment of the Lease With Option to Purchase: Is Allocation the
Answer? (1955) 11 Tax L. Rev. 65; Kirby, Considerations in Business Lease Ar-
rangements (1956) 34 Taxes 34.
'0IRC § 642(b).
27 IRC § 151(b).
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of the amount of his gross income, he may, if he is under 19 years of
age or is a "student," also be claimed by his parent for a $6oo de-
pendency exemption.' s
Discretionary Trusts
Maximum flexibility in the control of the family's aggregate in-
come tax bill is attained by granting the trustee the discretion to ac-
cumulate trust income. In this way, a comparison can be made be-
tween the projected income tax brackets of the trust and of the bene-
ficiaries, with the trustee determining the optimum point for the
division or accumulation of trust income.
"Combination" Trusts
If the donor is anxious to have the beneficiary receive some fixed
portion of the income each year, he may prefer to establish a "com-
bination" trust providing for a two-way treatment of the trust income:
part to be paid or applied for the beneficiary, and part to be dis-
tributed in the trustee's discretion. Or, if the donor does not want to
rely upon the trustee's discretion he might provide for a specific part
of the income to be paid or applied, and the balance to be accumu-
lated. Either of these arrangements would establish an automatic pro-
cedure for dividing income between the trustee and the beneficiary.
In addition, as to that part of the corpus requiring annual payment
or application of income, a partial gift tax exclusion would be avail-
able in the year of the transfer in trust.' 9
Accumulation Trusts
The income tax sections of the Code encourage trust provisions
which permit or require accumulations of income for a minor. For
example, the income beneficiary of a trust is freed from the applica-
tion of the 5-year throwback rule where there is a distribution to him
of income accumulated prior to his 21st birthday.20 Again, the Clifford
2l
provisions of the Code do not penalize the grantor of the trust when,
without the approval or consent of an "adverse party," income may or
must be accumulated during the minority of the income beneficiary.
2 2
TIRC § 151(e)(1)(B).
"See notes 84-88, infra.
21IRC § 665(b)(1).
2Helvering v. Clifford, 3o9 U. S. 331 (1940).
"IRC § 674(b)(7)(B). Under this provision, it is not necessary that the ac-
cumulations be paid to the beneficiary from whom the income was withheld. Com-
pare IRC § 674 (b)(6), which, as to all accumulations, establishes strict rules as to
the distribution pattern. Also, see Greenberger, Changes in the Income Taxation
of Clifford Type Trusts, Proc. N.Y.U. 13th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 165, 177
(1955).
1956]
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It should be noted, however, that the price to be paid for an ac-
cumulation provision, at least where it is of a mandatory nature, is
the probable loss of the gift tax exclusion.23 And, if the donor is also
a trustee of the trust, his reservation of a discretionary accumulation
power will carry with it estate tax consequences should he die before
the trust terminates.
24
Check List of Income Tax Pitfalls
The Code and the cases are replete with concepts aimed at block-
ing tax avoidance plans which lack tax substance. If the donor is not
willing to cut himself off entirely from the gift property-where he
retains strings attached to the aggregate bundle of rights comprising
"ownership" in the tax sense, or where he attempts to make the gift
property available for his personal use-he may find his well-laid plan
going askew.
In brief, before embarking on a program of gifts in trust, the
donor would be advised to keep in mind the following check-list of
income tax pitfalls:
(1) Anticipatory assignment of income: If the transaction is con-
sidered no more than a mere anticipatory assignment of income, the
donor still will be taxable on this income under the broad sweep of
Section 61(a), despite a prior legal transfer and a continuing flow of
income to the trustee.
25
'3See notes 113-115, infra.
"The reservation of an unlimited discretion to accumulate income will make
the trust corpus includable in the estate of the donor-trustee under IRC § 2036(a)(2).
See Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F. (2d) 8io (C. A. 8th, 1955), noted (1955) 41 Va. L. Rev.
391; Industrial Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 165 F. (2d) 142 (C. C. A. ist, 1947); Estate of
Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 TC 1164 (1949). However, where the power of accumulation is
limited by an ascertainable standard, the donor-trustee will escape estate taxation.
See Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. (2d) 74 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1947); Estate of Robert W. Weir,
17 TC 4o9 (1951). For a good discussion of the ascertainable standard problem in
another context, see Note, Deduction of a Charitable Remainder for Estate Tax
Purposes-A Valuation Problem (1955) 41 Va. L. Rev. 635.
OIRC § 671 indicates that Subpart E of the Code (§§ 671-678) is intended to be
the sole arbiter of the issue of taxability on the grounds of "dominion and con-
trol" over the trust. "However, this provision does not affect the principles govern-
ing the taxability of income to a grantor or assignor other than by reason of his
dominion and control over the trust." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 365
(1954). Thus IRC § 61(a) will still apply in situations involving assignment to a
trust of the future income of the assignor. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-38, 1955-4 IR.B 24; Hogle
v. Comm'r, 132 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. ioth, 1942). Compare Lum v. Comm'r,
147 F. (2d) 356 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945) (lessor-owner assignment of entire lease), with
Arthur T. Galt, 19 TC 892 (1953), aff'd 216 F. (2d) 41 (C. A. 7th, 1954), cert. den.
348 U. S. 951 (1955) (assignment of percentage of rentals), and Wareham C.
Seaman, TC Memo 1955-292, 14 TCM-(1955) (gift of all rent of month-to-month
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(2) Short-term trust: Where the corpus or income "will or may
reasonably be expected" to revert to him within io years, he may
find that this alone has subjected him to taxation.26 Exceptions to
this rule are made only for trusts for a designated charity and for
trusts continuing until the death of the income beneficiary.2 7
(3) Dispositive controls: Again, he may be taxed where the bene-
ficial enjoyment of the corpus or income is subject to a "power of
disposition" by himself or by a nonadverse party, or both, without the
approval or consent of an adverse party.28
(4) Administrative controls: The retention of certain specified ad-
ministrative powers by the donor or a nonadverse party, or both, may
also result in taxation to him.
2 9
(5) Revocable trusts: He may be taxed when the power to revest
in him title to any portion of the corpus is exercisable by him or a
nonadverse party, or both.30
(6) Income for donor's benefit: Taxation may similarly follow
where income, without the approval of an adverse party, is or, in the
discretion of the donor or a nonadverse party or both, may be (a) dis-
tributed to the donor, or (b) held or accumulated for future distribu-
tion to him.3 '
lease). For an interesting current analysis of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930), see
Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal Income Taxes
(955) 64 Yale L. J. 991.
-° IRC § 673(a) and (d).
-The grantor is not taxable under IRC § 673(a) in the following two specific
situations: (i) under IRC § 673(b), where the trust income is irrevocably payable
for a period of at least two years to "a designated beneficiary" which is of a type
described in IRC § 170(b)(i)(A) (i), (ii) or (iii); and (2) under IRC § 673(c),
where his reversionary interest is not to take effect until the death of the income
beneficiary. If the corpus will revert to the grantor's estate upon his death, the
grantor is taxable upon the trust income where his life expectancy is less than so
years. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-34, 1955-4 IRB 9.
See IRC § 674. Also, see Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, How to Use
Sprinkling Trusts (1955) 33 Taxes 532.
" IRC § 675.
1IRC § 676. For a consideration of the predecessor § 166 of the 1939 Code, see
Caplin, Protecting a Grantor of a Short-Term Trust Against Income Taxation
(1940) iS Taxes 677. The 1954 Code added IRC § 676(b), which answers a consti-
tutional problem raised in Helvering v. Dunning, ii8 F. (2d) 341, 345 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1941) , cert. den. 314 U. S. 631 (1941).
-1IRC § 677 (a)(i) and (2); cf. Rev. Rul. 54-516, 1954-2 CB 54, 56 (stating that,
if grantor remains liable in any capacity, other than as trustee, for mortgage on
realty transferred to trust, he is taxable on any income used to pay principal or
interest). But cf. Hays' Estate v. Comm'r, 181 F. (2d) 169, 171 (C. A. 5 th, 195o) (estate
tax); Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F. (2d) 632 (C. A. 5 th, 1954) (income tax). Income
which is actually distributed or required to be distributed to the grantor is now
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(7) Support trusts: He may be subject to taxation if, in the dis-
cretion of (a) another person or (b) the trustee or (c) the donor acting
as trustee or co-trustee, income may be applied or distributed for the
support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the donor is legally
obligated to support. The donor would here be taxed only to the
extent income was actually so applied or distributed.3 2 However,
should he reserve the power to himself in a nonfiduciary capacity, he
would find that he would be taxable on all of the trust income regard-
less of its application or distribution. In contrast, where trust income
is required to be distributed to a person to whom the donor owes a
legal obligation of support, taxation of the donor will hinge upon the
determination of his intention-i.e., whether or not he intended to
have this obligation satisfied through the use of trust income.
33
(8) Insurance trusts: The donor will also be taxable where the in-
come (a) without the approval of an adverse party, is applied, or (b)
in the discretion of the donor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be
applied, to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the
donor's life.3 4 However, taxation will be limited to that portion of
specifically covered by IRC § 677(a), whereas in the past it was necessary to lean
upon Section 22(a) of the 1939 Code. Cf. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935); S.
Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 37, (1954).
"IRC § 677(b). For estate tax purposes, the grantor will be deemed to have re-
tained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the prop-
erty" where the trust income is required to be distributed to discharge the grantor's
legal obligation of support or maintenance. See IRC § 2036(a)(I) and cf. Reg. 105
§ 81.18; Comm'r v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F. (2d) 298 (C. A. 2nd, 1953); Helver-
ing v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., iii F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940),
cert. den. So U. S. 654 (1940). But there is no estate tax imposed upon the donor
where a trustee other than himself has the discretion to use the income. See Comm'r
v. Douglass Estate, 143 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944), aff'g 2 TC 487 (1943), acq.;
McCullough v. Granger, 128 F. Supp. 61i (W. D. Pa. 1955); Estate of Alexander
K. Sessoms, 8 TCM 1056 (1949). Where the grantor was the trustee, the retention
of a discretionary power to apply income for the education and maintenance of
a minor resulted in the corpus being includable in the grantor's estate. Townsend
v. Thompson, 5o-2 USTC paragraph 10, 780 (E. D. Ark. 195o). Also, compare Estate
of Clayton William Sherman, 9 TC 594 (1947), non-acq., noted (1948) 48 Col. L. Rev.
293 (non-taxable), with Helfrich's Estate v. Comm'r, 143 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 7 th,
1944) (taxable). The grantor's intent as to the use of the trust income seems to have
determined the results in the last two cases.
"See Estate of Emanuel Sturman, ii TC 89o, 892-894 (1948), acq., distinguish-
ing J. Edward Johnston, 41 BTA 550 (194o), acq.
1IRC § 677(a)(3). A "three-way" trust may provide a satisfactory approach to
the funded insurance arrangement-with the wife contributing the securities, the
husband contributing the policies, and the children serving as the beneficiaries. See
Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured,
Proc. N. Y. U. 13 th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 247, 261-264 (1955).
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the trust income necessary to pay premiums on the policies in the trust
which were in existence during the tax year.35
(9) "Grandfather" trusts: Even where someone other than the
taxpayer has created and funded the trust, he must still be aware of
income tax dangers inherent in the granting to him of certain powers.
For example, he would be taxable if he were granted the power
exercisable "solely by himself" to vest corpus or income in himself.3 6
Yet if this power were limited to income alone, he would escape tax-
ation if, under Sections 671 through 677, the grantor himself were
otherwise treated as the owner.3 7
(1o) "Grandfather" support trusts: Where the power granted to
the taxpayer under a "grandfather" trust was merely to apply income
to the support of a person whom he was obligated to support, and
where he was granted this power "in the capacity of trustee or co-
trustee," then he would be taxable only to the extent that the income
was so applied.33 In turn, if the power were exercisable by him in a
nonfiduciary capacity, all of the trust income would be taxable to
him, regardless of its application. On the other hand, if the trust re-
quired another person to join with him in the exercise of this power,
he should not be taxable at all-whether he had been granted this
power as a fiduciary or not.3 9 And, although the result is not free of
doubt,40 he should not be taxable under the present form of the
statute41 when another person alone has the discretion, or when the
crank C. Rand, 40 BTA 233 (1939), acq., aff'd 116 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941), cert. den. 313 U. S. 594 (1941). Also, see Joseph Well, 3 TC 579, 584 (1944),
acq.; Genevieve F. Moore, 39 BTA 8o8, 812-813 (1939), acq.
1IRC § 678(a)(1), adopting the rule of Richardson v. Comm'r, 121 F. (2d) 1
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 684 (1941), and Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146
F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. den. 324 U. S. 871 (1945).
-2qRC § 678(b).
IRC § 678(c).
rlThe reference to "co-trustee" in IRC § 678(c) has been the cause of some
concern among tax commentators. See Stern, A Tax Trap for the Family Trustee
(1955) 33 Taxes 594- Compare Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate
Planning (1955) 68 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 46o-461 (co-trustee is taxable), with Kamin,
Surrey and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Bene-
ficiaries (1954) 54 Col. L. Rev. 1237, 1263 (not taxable). In coordinating the various
provisions of IRC § 678, it would appear that the words "solely by himself" contained
in IRe § 678(a)(1) are intended to be read into IRG § 678(c) in the following fash-
ion: ". . . which enables such person [solely by himself], in the capacity of
trustee or co-trustee.. .", etc.
"OCf. Winton, Taxation of Nongrantors Under Trusts for Support of Their
Dependents (1955) 33 Taxes 804, 8W6.
"IRC §§ 61(a), 677 and 678. As to the interplay of IRC §§ 61(a) and 671, see note
25, supra.
1956]
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trust instrument itself requires the use of income, to discharge his
support obligations.
4 2
(ii) Substitution of trustee: As a final word of precaution, con-
sideration should be given to the advisability of reserving to the donor
the power to substitute trustees. If the power is unlimited-permitting
the donor to remove trustees without cause and to replace them-the
donor may be vulnerable to both income and estate taxation.43 Under
the 1939 Code, the donor's possession of such unlimited power could
subject him to income taxation under the Clifford doctrine. Through
this incident of dominion and control, the donor was deemed to
possess all of the powers initially granted to the trustee; and, where
the actual possession of such powers by the donor would have resulted
in his being taxable, then this constructive possession similarly brought
taxation.
44
Whether income taxation will follow under the 1954 Code is con-
troversial-in view of the failure of Congress to cover this situation
specifically and in view of the exclusive scope given to Subpart E in
the Clifford area.4 5 In Section 672, Congress adopted almost verbatim,
with one exception, Section X85 i of the American Law Institute Fed-
eral Income Tax Statute.4 6 The unexplained exception is ALI Sec-
tion X85 1(d), which provides: "If the grantor or a related or subordin-
ate party has the power to remove a trustee without cause, the grantor
shall be treated as possessing the powers of that trustee."47 While some
solace may be found in this omission, yet it can hardly be recom-
mended that the unlimited right of substitution be reserved.
However, the reservation of a power to appoint a substitute
4"See Stern v. Comm'r, 137 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1943); Frank E. Joseph,
5 TC L049 (1945), acq. Also, cf. Allen v. Nunnally, 18o F. (2d) 318 (C. A. 5 th, 195o).
Contra: Reg. 118 § 39.62-1(f).
"For estate tax purposes, a trustee's power to alter or amend a trust was attrib-
uted to a decedent because of his reservation of the power to remove and substitute
the trustee. Loughridge's Estate v. Comm'r, 183 F. (2d) 294 (C. A. ioth, 195o), cert den.
340 U. S. 830 (195o). Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-393, 1955-25 IRB 19, 2o (mere power to fill
vacancy not taxable).
"Warren H. Coming, 24 TC No. 1OO (1955); Louis Stockstrom, 4 TC 5 (1944),
aff'd 151 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); George H. Deuble, 42 BTA 277 (1940),
acq. Also, cf. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941); McCutchin v. Comm'r,
159 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1947); Nate S. Shapero, 8 TC 104 (1947), aff'd 165
F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 6th, 1948), cert. den. 334 U. S. 844 (1948). For consideration
of the same issue in a family partnership case, see Harvey v. Comm'r, 5-2 USTC
paragraph 9769 (C. A. 6th, 1955).
5IRC § 671, discussed in note 25, supra.




trustee only in the event of a vacancy should not result in estate tax-
ation48 or income taxation. The exercise of such a power would be
contingent in nature-depending upon the resignation, death or dis-
qualification of the original trustee-and consequently, would not
seem to constitute a degree of control sufficient to attribute to the
donor the powers granted to the trustee.
4 9
GIFT TAX EXCLUSIONS FOR TRANSFERS IN TRUST
When the donor has been competently advised, the trust instru-
ment which he is prepared to execute either will avoid adverse income
and estate tax consequences, or will be drawn with a complete under-
standing and the acceptance of these consequences. At the same time, he
will have given consideration to the gift tax results of his proposed
transfers in trust.
The donor will, of course, be told of his $3o,ooo specific exemption
from the gift tax available during his lifetime;50 and of the doubling
of this exemption from a practical standpoint where his wife signi-
fies her consent that his gift be considered as made one-half by her.5'
He will also be told that this lifetime exemption will be available
whether the gifts are considered "future interests" or present interests.
But when he turns to his annual gift tax exclusion of $3,ooo per
donee-or 6,ooo per donee where his wife consents to gift-splitting-
the question of "future interests" assumes special importance, inas-
much as the exclusion will be denied unless a gift of a present in-
terest is involved.52 The availability of the annual exclusion for gifts
in trust cannot be dismissed as inconsequential, for trusts of this type
are often of the "open-end" variety, permitting periodic additions of
principal either by the donor or by some other person. Consequently,
through an annual gift program during the minority of a child, there
'-See Rev. Rul. 55-393, 1955-25 IRB 19, 20; cf. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. (2d)
74, 77 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1947) (contingent nature of power of invasion).
'Cf. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F. (2d) 506, 509 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945) (circum-
scribed power of substitution); Central Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 141 F. (2d) 352 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1944) (right to substitute another trust company).
rIRC § 2521.
tIlRC § 2513. For explanation of the requirements for filing gift tax returns
where spouses split gifts, see Rev. Rul. 54-252, 1942-2 CB 322. As to the interplay
between the lifetime specific exemption and the gifts-splitting provisions, see
Rev. Rul. 54-30, 1954-1 GB 207. Also, cf. Matthew P. Whittall, 24 TC No. 91 (1955)
(gift-splitting privilege denied where part of gift in trust was made to spouse, and
where the court was unable to ascertain that part of the gift made to third parties).
0IRC § 25o3(b). A gift to husband and wife jointly, with right of survivorship,
is regarded as a gift to the individuals, and is not treated as a separate gift to
the estate of tenants by the entireties. Estate of G. A. Buder, 25 TC No. 112 (1956).
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is a potential of shifting some 126,ooo' of principal from the donor
to a child without any gift tax impact. This result is even more striking
in the light of the accretion to the fund which follows from compound-
ing the annual net income remaining in the trust after deducting
taxes at the trust's comparatively low rate. As it was recently sug-
gested:53 "It would be interesting to calculate the result, say at a 4
per cent rate, and compare it with what could be left to the child at
age 21 if the father had retained his $6,ooo per annum and invested and
compounded the income at the same rate, after his high taxes. The
comparison would have to take into account, of course, that the trust
method would pass the aggregate ultimate fund without gift or es-
tate tax, while the retention method would be subject either to an
immediate gift tax or an eventual estate tax."
For the donor of more modest means, the tax savings can still be
substantial when the trustee accumulates all of the income and princi-
pal for the infant beneficiary.
Statutory Boiler-Plate Trust
If the donor is bargaining for the full exclusion, Section 2503(c)
supplies him with a complete answer, provided he is willing to meet
the strict statutory requirements. 54 The section expressly states that
no part of a gift to a minor shall be considered a gift of a future
interest if both the property and the income therefrom may be ex-
pended by or for the benefit of the minor before his attaining the age
of 21, and will to the extent not so expended (a) pass to the minor
on his attaining the age of 21, and (b) in the event he should die be-
fore attaining the age of 2 1, be payable to his estate or as he may
appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in Sec-
tion 2514(c).
Regulations under Section 2503(c) have not yet been proposed.
Accordingly, until we have official guides, it is suggested that drafts-
men who seek to qualify trusts under this section give consideration
to the following points:
(i) Discretionary accumulation: It is not necessary that the income
be actually expended by or for the benefit of the minor during his
minority;55 however, the trust must allow for such an expenditure
nSee Wormser, Change in Tax Planning Necessitated by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954-Estate and Gift Tax Phases, 4 th Ann. Tulane Tax Inst. 77, 86
(1955).
rFor an analysis and criticism of IRC § 25o3(c), see Caplin, supra note i,
at 214-221.
nSee S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 479 (1954).
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or distribution. It would seem, therefore, that a provision for dis-
cretionary accumulation would satisfy the statute, while a provision
for mandatory accumulation would not.
(2) Discretionary invasion: Corpus, too, need not be actually ex-
pended for or distributed to the minor during his minority,5 6 al-
though the trust instrument must make provision for the availability
of all of the corpus. Here, it would seem sufficient if a discretionary
power of invasion were included. If the trust required mandatory in-
vasion as to part of the corpus, there should also be a provision for
discretionary invasion as to the balance. 57
(3) Unlimited discretion: The discretion as to accumulation and
invasion should extend to all of the undistributed income and prin-
cipal. Moreover, it would seem advisable not to place any limitation
upon the exercise of this discretion.58 Even the insertion of some
standard-such as support, maintenance, education, health, emergency,
etc.-to act as a guide in the exercise of the discretion, should be
discouraged at this time.
(4) Discretion in fiduciary: Section 2503(c) does not designate the
person who is to exercise the discretion as to accumulation and invas-
ion. Literally, the statute would be satisfied if anyone possessed the
power-the donor, a parent, a friend, a legal guardian, or the minor
himself, or even if different discretions were granted to different per-
sons.G0 Nevertheless, it would seem advisable at present to grant the dis-
cretion to a trustee or trustees, and to have the discretion exercisable
only in a fiduciary capacity. This would certainly be the usual means
of having the discretion exercised, and would fit into a pattern con-
sistent with the use of the trust arrangement.
(5) Distribution at 2z: Provision should be made for a complete
distribution to the beneficiary of both corpus and accumulations upon
his reaching 21. If the trust is to continue after such date, it is doubt-
ful whether the property would be regarded as "passing" to the bene-
r4 Ibid.
FAs to other reasons for using a "combination" trust see p. 149, supra.
OUnder IRC § 2503(c)(1), it is sufficient "if the property and the income there-
from ... may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee" [italics supplied].
It could be argued, of course, that the statute is technically satisfied if there is any
reasonable possibility that the property and income could be so used. However, in the
light of the history of the judicial development of the definition of "future in-
terests," which led to the adoption of IRC § 25o3(c), this interpretation of the statute
would appear to be unsound.
m'Ibid.
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ficiary at age 21, even though it were made subject to the absolute de-
mand of the beneficiary on and after his 2 ist birthday.60
(6) Distribution at death: The statute requires that, in the event
of the minor's death before age 21, the property and income be payable
to his estate or as he may appoint under a general power of appoint-
ment.6 1 And it is clear, under the Senate Finance Committee Report,
that "the general power of appointment need not be limited to one
exercisable by will." 62 To avoid any possible conflict in interpreta-
tion, it is recommended that the trust provide for payment directly
to the estate of the minor. Or, if greater flexibility is desired, pro-
vision can be made for payment in accordance with the minor's
exercise of a general power of appointment; but, to the extent that
there be a default in such exercise, the trust should provide for ulti-
mate payment to his estate.63 In other words, there should be no
takers in default other than the minor's estate.
6 4
(7) Spendthrift clause: Where a trust otherwise qualifies under Sec-
tion 2503(c), a spendthrift provision should not defeat the availability
of the full gift tax exclusion. Under the 1939 Code, the Internal
Revenue Service had ruled that a "gift of the present right to enjoy
the income from a trust corpus for a period of years or for life will not
be held to be one of a future interest in property solely because of
the inclusion of a provision or clause which prohibits the income
beneficiary from alienating, assigning or otherwise anticipating such
income." 65 This disregard of the relevance of a spendthrift provision
should similarly follow under Section 2503(c).
(8) Trust res: Section 2503 (c) states that no part of a gift to a
minor "shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property" if
the property and income therefrom are held, administered and dis-
posed of in accordance with the provisions of the section. Nothing is
said about the character of the gift property; consequently, the statute
would seem to be satisfied whether the gift property were income pro-
For an analysis of IRC § 25o3(c)(2), see Caplin, supra note i, at 216-218.
0 IRC § 25 03 (c)(2)(B).
2S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 479 (1954).
6'The validity of the minor's attempted exercise of a general power of appoint-
ment would obviously be first tested under local law.
'3 Section Xioo9 (a)(i) of the American Law Institute Federal Gift Tax Statute,
which is based upon IRC § 2503(c), specifically provides that the property shall be
payable, "in default of the exercise of that power [of appointment), to his estate."
See Tentative Draft No. so, American Law Institute Federal Income, Estate and
Gift Tax Statute 1O-11 (April 30, 1955).
"Rev. Rul. 54-344, 1954-2 CB 3ig. Also see Gilmore v. Comm'r, 213 F. (2d)
520, 521 (C. A. 6th, 1954).
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ducing or not-or even whether the gift property were by its very na-
ture a future interest in property, such as a vested remainder subject
to an outstanding life estate.66 Life insurance policies6 7 as well as other
types of nonincome-producing properties 6s would thus appear to be
valid subjects for gifts to a Section 2503(c) trust, although there might
be other tax reasons militating against this type of transfer.6 9
(9) Trustee: Anyone may presumably act as trustee under Section
25o(c). He might be a friend or even a "related or subordinate party."
70
However, from an estate tax standpoint, it would be inadvisable
for the donor to act as trustee or co-trustee for this would cause the
corpus to be included in his estate should he die before the trust ter-
minated.
71
The reward to be gained in using the statutory boiler-plate trust
is a dollar of gift tax exclusion for each dollar of value transferred to
the trustee up to the maximum statutory limit. The price to be paid
for this is compliance with the rigid trust pattern imposed by Section
2503(c)-particularly the requirement for mandatory distribution of
the entire property, including. accumulated income, at a time when
the beneficiary may not have attained sufficient maturity to accept
full financial responsibility.
Gilmore-Stifel Trust
If the donor is desirous of securing the full exclusion but is not
willing to meet the demands of Section 2503(c), he has one more string
Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-401, 1954-2 CB 32o; Rosa A. Howze, 2 TO 1254 (1943).
"7Gifts in trust of life insurance policies or of premium payments thereon have
previously been held to involve gifts of future interests. E.g., Comm'r v. Boeing, 123
F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); Jesse S. Phillips, 12 TC 16 (1949); Dora Roberts,
2 TC 679 (1943), aff'd 143 F. (2d) 657 (0. 0. A. 5 th, 1944), cert. den. 324 U. S. 841
(1954); cf. Frances P. Bolton, i TO 717 (1943). But cf. Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-26
IRB 32, considered in notes 3-5.
'See Gilmore v. Comm'r, 213 F. (2d) 520, 522 (C. A. 6th, 1954); cf. Comm'r v.
Kempner, 126 F. (2d) 853 (C. 0. A. 5 th, 1942) (non-interest bearing notes); Floyd H.
Newmaker, 12 TCM 232 (1953) (closely held stock); Elizabeth Hunter Polk, 5 TOM
357 (1946) (closely held stock).
OAs to the income tax consequences of funded insurance trusts, see notes
34 and 35.
",For a definition of this term for the purposes of Subpart E of the income tax
provisions, see IRO § 672(c).
71A donor-trustee's reservation of a discretionary power of invasion will result
in the trust corpus being includable in his estate under IRO § 2o38(a)(i). See
Lober v. United States, 346 U. S. 355 (1953); cf. Comm'r v. Holmes, 326 U. S. 480
(1946). As to a discretionary power of accumulation, see note 24, supra. As to
a discretionary power to substitute trustees, see notes 43 and 48, supra. As to the
use of trust income or corpus to discharge the donor's legal obligations, see note
32, supra. For a consideration of these and related problems under the 1939 Code,
see Schneider, The Inter-Vivos Trust for a Minor: Its Estate Tax Aspect (ig5o) 28
Taxes 825.
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to his bow: he may be willing to do battle for the full exclusion by
establishing a trust similar to the ones found in the Gilmore 72 and
Stifel73 cases.
This type of trust usually provides for the continuation of the
trust during the lifetime of the minor beneficiary, with income to be
distributed or accumulated in the discretion of the trustee, but with
the beneficiary or any legally appointed guardian being granted an
absolute and unlimited right to demand the accumulations and corpus
at any time. A legal guardian is usually not appointed under this
arrangement.
By providing for a continuation of the trust beyond the beneficiary's
2ist birthday, the donor has violated what appears to be one of the
primary requirements of Section 2503(c). His only basis for claiming
the full exclusion would be on the theory (a) that Section 2503(c)
does not preempt the area dealing with the full exclusion for gifts in
trust, and (b) that existing case law on the subject continues to
possess its full vitality. From this he would argue that the beneficiary's
unlimited right to terminate the trust was tantamount to a gift of a
present interest as described in the Fondren74 and Disston75 cases; and
that the technical legal disability of minority did not convert what
would be a present interest for an adult into a future interest for
a minor.
He probably would prevail on his first premise that Section 2503(c)
was not intended as the exclusive method for determining whether a
gift in trust constituted in its entirety a gift of a present interest. But
as to his second proposition, he would encounter a conflict in the cases.
Absent the prior appointment of an independent legal guardian,
he would undoubtedly be defeated in the Internal Revenue Service
1 6
the Tax Court77 and the Second Circuit.7 8 Before these tribunals,
the infant's legal inability to make an effective demand for the
corpus and accumulations would be regarded as defeating his "right
presently to use, possess or enjoy the property."
7
"Gilmore v. Comm'r, 213 F. (2d) 520 (C. A. 6th, 1954).
"Stifel v. Comm'r, 197 F. (2d) 107 (0. A. 2nd, 1952).
uFondren v. Comm'r, 324 U. S. 18 (1945).
jComm'r v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442 (1954).
76Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 GB 207.
7Genevieve U. Gilmore, 2o TO 579 (1953), rev'd 213 F. (2d) 520 (C. A. 6th, 1954);
Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., 17 TO 647 (1951), aff'd 197 F. (2d) 107 (C. A. 2nd, 1952);
John W. Kieckhefer, 15 TO iii (195o), rev'd 189 F. (2d) 118 (C. A. 7 th, 1951); Wil-
liam H. Pope, 12 TGM 464 (1953). See Robert C. Ross, TO Memo 1955-273, 14
TOM- (1955), which also involves the Evans-Brody problem. See notes 97-98, infra.
sStifel v. Comm'r, 197 F. (2d) 107 (C. A. 2nd, 1952).
"See Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U. S. 18, 2o (1945).
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However, before the Sixth and Seventh Circuits he would prevail.80
There, "the right given to the donee, in the trust instrument, to use,
possess, or enjoy... determines whether the gift is one of present or
future interest."81The restrictions and contingencies imposed by the
legal disability of minority are not regarded by these two courts as
being decisive.
In all events, if the trust instrument should provide for the manda-
tory application or distribution of income on at least an annual basis,
he would be entitled to a partial exclusion under the Sensenbrenner-
Fisher rule as implemented by Section 25 03 (b).8
2 And under what
may turn out to be a strained interpretation of Section 2503 (b), he
may be entitled to this partial exclusion even though there has been




The donor might not be willing to create a Section 25o3(c) trust,
nor might he be willing to include the right of termination found
in a Gilmore-Stifel type trust. All that he may be interested in ac-
complishing is to provide for the mandatory application or distribu-
tion of income during the life of the minor or during a specified period
of time.
If this is his sole wish, he will be gratified to learn that he will be
making a gift of a present interest in income, although the gift of
corpus will plainly constitute a future interest.8 4 Under the Sensen-
brenner and Fisher line of cases,8 5 this present right to income is
generally valued under the tables set forth in the gift tax regulations
for the valuation of annuities, life estates, remainders and reversions.80
On occasion, particularly where nonincome-producing properties
are involved, these tables may not be regarded as the sole determinative
of value.8
7
"'Gilmore v. Comm'r, 213 F. (2d) 52o (C. A. 6th, 1954); Kieckhefer v. Comm'r,
189 F. (2d) ii8 (C. A. 7th, 1951). Also, cf. Baker v. United States, 56-1 USTC para-
graph 1, 582 (M. D. N. C. 1955); Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W. D. N. C.
95gi), app. dism'd (C. A. 4th, 1951); Streakalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556
(D. C. Mass. 1948).
6"See Gilmore v. Comm'r, 213 F. (2d) 520, 522 (C. A. 6th, 1954).:
2See notes 97-102, infra. ,
3See notes 1o8.111, infra.
6Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-344, 1954-2 CB 319.
Sensenbrenner v. Comm'r, 134 F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1943); Fisher v.
Comm'r, 132 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942). Also, see Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U. S.
18, 21 (1945).
"Reg. io8 § 86.g(f).
6"Some courts have found that gifts of nonincome-producing properties in-
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Here, though, he will encounter an "anomalous" result bearing on
valuation. For, in the computation of the annual exclusion available to
him, a higher value will be placed upon (a) a gift in trust granting to
the beneficiary a present right to income for life, with remainder to
another, than upon (b) a gift in trust granting to the beneficiary a
present right to income for a shorter period of time, with remainder
to this same beneficiary.88 This follows from the fact that the courts
regard transfers in trust as having effected two separate gifts-a present
interest in income and a future interest in corpus-with the valuation
of the income interest being dependent upon the duration of the
trust term.
"Spray" or "Sprinkling" Trust
The donor should be cautioned, however, that if he desires to add
a "spray" or "sprinkling" provision to his Sensenbrenner-Fisher type
trust he will lose the exclusion in its entirety. Thus, if he requires
the trustee to apply or distribute all of the trust income to a class
of designated beneficiaries, but grants the trustee the discretion to
determine each year the portion of the income to be applied or paid
to each particular beneficiary, there is no accepted actuarial method for
placing a value on the present right to receive income.8 9 Each of such
beneficiary's right to receive income may technically be a present in-
terest; yet as the Internal Revenue Service recently pointed out, the
value of this right to income as to any particular beneficiary is not sus-
ceptible of determination. 90 And this result follows whether there is a
"horizontal" spray as between brothers or sisters, or a "vertical" spray as
between parent and child.91
volved "future interests," while others have concluded that they were unable to
determine the value of the present interests in such properties. Cf. cases cited in
notes 67-68, supra. Also cf. Reg. io8 §§ 86.11 and 86.ig(f)( 3) (use of nonincome-
producing property). As to the exclusion limitations under annuity arrangements,
see Matthew P. Whittall, 24 TC No. 91 (1955).
"See Charles v. Hassett, 43 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D. C. Mass. 1942); Fisher v.
Comm'r, 132 F. (2d) 383, 386 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942). Also cf. Wisotzkey v. Comm'r,
144 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944).
UE.g., Helvering v. Blair, 121 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941); Winston Paul,
46 BTA 920 (1942). Presumably a valuation could be made where the "spray"
power was limited by an ascertainable standard, and where the donor was able
to establish "that a steady flow of some ascertainable portion of income to the
minor would be required." Cf. Comm'r v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442, 449 (1945). If the
"spray" power also included a discretionary accumulation power, the gift would
not qualify for the exclusion on two grounds: (i) it would be a future interest, and
(2) it would be "inherently incapable of valuation." Cf. Welch v. Paine, 13o F. (2d)
99 o , 992 (C. C. A. Ist, 1942); Comm'r v. Phillips' Estate, 1a6 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 5 th,
1942); Estate of Caroline C. Wells, 2 TCM 446 (1943).
'*Rev. Rul. 55-303, 1955-20 IRB 25-
"For a discussion of spray powers, see Fleming, The Uses of Powers in Estate
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Judge Learned Hand, in Helvering v. Blair,92 aptly described the
valuation problem in a "spray" trust in the following fashion: "In
order to calculate the value of an interest subject to such a condition,
we should have to have some actuarial basis for the probability that
trustees who had once made such a division would not disturb it.
Obviously nothing of the kind is available or would in all likelihood
be a sound basis for inference if it was compiled."
Even when the beneficiaries' respective shares have been fixed
initially by the donor, the exclusion will be denied if the trust instru-
ment specifically provides for a discretionary power to open up the
class of beneficiaries. 93 Such unrestricted discretion to cause the in-
come to be divided among a larger group destroys any reasonable
basis for valuing the present interests of the individual donees.
However, if the number in a class may be altered only by the
contingency of death or birth, the Internal Revenue Service has re-
cently indicated that part of the exclusion would be available. In
Revenue Ruling 55-679, it held that "where it can be demonstrated
that the value of the present interest of each beneficiary in the in-
come from a trust... will equal $g,ooo, the gift tax exclusions author-
ized by Section 25 03 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are
allowable although the number of eventual donees is not ascertain-
able or the present interest of each beneficiary is not susceptible of
valuation."94 An explanation of this approach is found in Revenue
Ruling 55-678, which states: 95 "In other words, if after taking into
consideration all possible future contingencies, it can be shown that
the present interest given has some ascertainable value, based upon
sound actuarial principles, then the exclusion is allowable to the
extent of the minimum value of such interest, or $3,ooo, whichever is
the lesser. In such cases it is not necessary that the exact value of the
gift of the present interest in property be determinable on the basis
of recognized actuarial principles."
This practical solution of a difficult problem offers a sharp con-
trast to the highly conceptualistic approach taken by the Internal
Revenue Service in the Evans-Brody type of trust.9 6
Planning (1954) 32 Taxes 24, 28; also, Mannheimer, Wheeler and Friedman,
How to Use Sprinkling Trusts (1955) 33 Taxes 532.
C-22i F. (2d) 945, 947 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941).
'Vogel v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 103 (D. C. Mass. 1941).
09955 -46 IRB 12.
t5 d. at 11.
"See notes 97 and 98, infra.
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Evans-Brody Trusts: Section 25 o3 (b)
Prior to the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1954, a donor lost the
exclusion in its entirety where, in a mandatory distribution trust, he
inserted a discretionary invasion provision in favor of the income
beneficiary. While the beneficiary of such a trust obviously possessed
a more valuable present economic interest than an income beneficiary
who had no possibility of receiving corpus, the rule gradually-and,
it seems, erroneously-evolved that the income interest of such a bene-
ficiary was incapable of valuation. Slyvia H. Evans97 and Jennie Brody9s
were the leading carriers of this disturbing news.
Be that as it may, Section 2503 (b) was inserted in the Code with the
stated aim of correcting this judicial deviation.99 It accomplishes this
by providing that where "there has been a transfer to any person of
a present interest in property, the possibility that such interest may
be diminished by the exercise of a power shall be disregarded...
if no part of such interest will at any time pass to any other person."
Today, therefore, Section 25 o3 (b) entitles the creator of this type
trust to an exclusion under the Sensenbrenner-Fisher rule,100 so long as
the income must be paid to or applied for the benefit of the beneficiary,
and so long as the invasion power is exercisable only in favor of the
income beneficiary. The partial exclusion is here not dependent upon
the disposition of the remainder interest. For, whether the remainder
is payable to the income beneficiary, his estate, or to another, the same
portion of the exclusion will be available to the donor.1' 1 Presumably
his present right to receive income will be valued at the same amount
that it would be in the absence of this power of invasion. 0 2
Section 25 03 (b) is a relief provision which is operative only if "no
part" of the beneficiary's present right to income may be diminished
by the exercise of a power in favor of another. Nevertheless, the section
does not purport to supersede prior case law and, under these de-
cisions, a partial exclusion should still be allowed to the extent that
the income beneficiary's interest is not subject to diminution. For
example, when the power to invade in favor of another is unlimited,
no part of the exclusion is allowable under either Section 2503 (b) or
17 TC 206 (1951), aff'd 98 F. (2d) 435 (C. A. 3rd, 1952).
"1i9 TC 126 (1952). Also, see Rev. Rul. 54-92, 1954-1 CB 207; Estate of Brigid A.
Casey, 25 TC No. 86 (1956); Robert C. Ross, TC Memo 1955-273, 14 TCM-(19 5 5 );
Regina L. Herrmann, TC Memo 1955-212, 14 TCM-0 9 55 ); Cadwell Tyler, II, 12
TCM 407 (1953)-
9S. Rep. No. A622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 478 (1954)-
"'See notes 84-88, supra.
101S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 478-479 (1954).
"'See notes 85-87, supra.
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previous judicial decisions.' 03 On the other hand, where such power
is limited by some ascertainable standard or by a dollar amount, Sec-
tion 2503 (b) would still not be available, but, under the cases, a
partial exclusion should be allowed for that part of the beneficiary's
present right to income which cannot be diverted to someone else.' 04
It should be kept in mind that Section 25 03(b) corrects a valuation
problem, not one of "future interests."' 0 5 If the section is to be relied
upon, therefore, the donor must be sure that both the property con-
veyed' 00 and the terms of the trust' 07 meet the present interest test.
Discretionary Accumulation Trust
Under the Disston and Fondren cases, the exclusion is forfeited
when the trustee is granted a discretionary power to accumulate in-
come, at least in the absence of "some indication from the face of
the trust or surrounding circumstances that a steady flow of some
ascertainable portion of income to the minor would be required."'10s
This type trust has been held to involve transfers of future interests,
both as to income and corpus.1 09
Yet, Section 2503(b) of the 1954 Code provides that where there
" Andrew Geller, 9 TC 848 (1947); Margaret A. C. Riter, 3 TC 3o (1944).
'See William Harry Kniep, 9 T.C. 943 (1947), aff'd 172 F. (ad) 755 (C. A. 8th,
1949) (invasion limited to $i,ooo per year for each beneficiary). Also, cf. Andrew
Geller, 9 TC 484, 495 (1947), (recognizing "ascertainable standard" approach but
making distinction on the facts); Saul Reinfeld, HC Memo 1955-35, 14 TCM-(19 5 5 ).
"5The Senate Finance Committee Report erroneously refers to the Evans-Brody
issue as a "future interests" problem, whereas the courts regarded it as simply a
question of valuation. Compare S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 478-479 (1954),
with cases in notes 97 and 98, supra. Also, cf. A.L.I.'s proposed Section Xioog(c)
and related notes, which recognize the issue to be one of valuation. Tentative
Draft No. so, American Law Institlite Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute
12, 128-129 (April 30, 1955).
"'See notes 66-68, supra.
"1Where the trust provides for a delay period before distributing income,
a "future interest" is created. Hessenbruch v. Comm'r, 178 F. (2d) 785 (C. A. 3rd,
195o) (three months); Estate of Louise Jardell, 24 TC No. 72 (1955) (less than three
months); Matthew P. Whittall, 24 TC No. 91 (1955) (until time of school enrollment).
Similarly, a provision making income payments contingent or uncertain will create
a "future interest." E.g., Comm'r v. Brandegee, 123 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941)
(contingent upon discharge of mortgage); Shefner v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 936 (D. C.
Minn. 1955) (uncertainty as to time and amount); Matthew P. Whittall, supra
(various contingencies).
1'"Comm'r v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442, 449 (1945); also Fondren v. Comm'r, 324
U. S. 18 (1945). The result is the same where the discretion is exercised by someone
other than the trustee. Cf. Shefner v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 936 (D. C. Minn. 1955).
1'3E.g., Frances McGuire Rassas, 17 TC 16o (1951), aff'd 196 F. (2d) 611 (C. A. 7th,
1952); Andrew Geller, 9 TC 484, 494 (1947); William H. Pope, 12 TCM 646 (1953)-
This same result was reached before the Fondren and Disston cases even where
the income beneficiary had a vested right to the accumulations. Comm'r v. Gardner,
127 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
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has been a transfer of a "present interest" in property, the possibility
that this interest may be diminished by the exercise of a "power"
shall be disregarded if no part of such interest is to pass to any other
person. The statute does not attempt to define the term "power"; and
it might be argued that a power of accumulation, as well as a power
of invasion, falls literally within the ambit of the section. While the
Committee Reports discuss a difficulty sought to be cured-that is, the
invasion problem raised in the Evans type case"10-the position could
reasonably be taken that the comments in the Committee Reports
were not meant to be exclusive, and that the plain meaning of the
statute applies equally to both accumulation and invasion powers.
This analysis presupposes that, except for the existence of such a
power, a "present interest" had otherwise been created. Why would not
this be so if the trust were drafted along the following lines: "Income
to be paid to or applied for the benefit of Able during his life, with
corpus over to Baker. Provided, however, that during Able's minority,
the trustee may accumulate income; but, in all events, these accu-
mulations shall be paid to Able at age 2 1 or, if he should die before
then, to his estate"?11 Does the initial income provision constitute
a "present interest" under the Sensenbrenner-Fisher rule?1 2 Can it
be said that "no part of such interest will at any time pass to any
other person"? Is Able's estate to be regarded as another "person"?
The donor of such a trust may make a persuasive argument sup-
porting the allowance of the exclusion under the Sensenbrenner-
Fisher approach. However, unless the forthcoming regulations give
recognition to this type trust, the donor will undoubtedly have to liti-
gate if he is to prevail.
Mandatory Accumulation Trust
Where the donor inserts in the trust instrument a direction that
the income must be accumulated over a given period of time, there is
little chance that part of the exclusion would be allowable under
Section 25 03 (b). Such a right to income would clearly constitute a
20S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 478 (1954).
mThis argument for discretionary accumulation trusts leans heavily on the
'niceties of the art of conveyancing." Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 3o9 U. S. 106, 117
(1940). For example, the suggested draft is substantially the same as a trust which
provides for mandatory accumulation but which allows discretionary invasion.
Gifts to this latter type trust have been held to be transfers of "future interests"
under prior law, even where the beneficiary possessed a vested right in the accu-
mulations. E.g., Comm'r v. Taylor, 122 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941); Welch v.
Paine, 12o F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. Ist, 1941); cf. Wyss v. United States, 55-1 USTC
paragraph 11,543 (S. D. Ill. 1955).
3 -'See notes 84-88, supra.
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future interest under the Pelzer and Ryerson cases;" 3 accordingly,
it is dubious whether the new statute would be of any avail.
The solution may not appear as simple as it first sounds after testing
it against a specific example:
Let us suppose that the trust initially provides for a mandatory
distribution of income during the lifetime of the beneficiary, and
then includes a clause to the effect that, during the beneficiary's minori-
ty, the income is to be accumulated, with provisions for the ultimate
distribution of the accumulations either to the beneficiary or to his
estate." 4 The arguments asserted in favor of the exclusion for a dis-
cretionary accumulation trust might again be marshalled here. Never-
theless, it is difficult to envisage a court being persuaded that this
trust created a "present interest" in income through what is es-
sentially a mere drafting technique. For, unlike a discretionary ac-
cumulation trust, the proposed trust makes it impossible for any in-
come to be distributed during the beneficiary's minority.
Where a mandatory accumulation trust also provides for a dis-
cretionary power of invasion, the problem of limiting the availability
of the exclusion becomes more acute. Here, the trust would be sub-
stantially the same as a discretionary accumulation trust;"15 and if
the latter is to qualify under Section 2503(b) so should the former.
CONCLUSION
Section 2503(c) was proudly presented to the tax world with the
beguiling announcement that it describes "a certain type of gift to a
minor which will not be treated as a gift of a future interest."" 6 While
this statement is entirely accurate as far as it goes, it must not be for-
gotten that one of the conditions to the availability of this section is
a trust provision requiring the outright distribution to the income
beneficiary of both corpus and accumulations at his 21st birthday.
This can prove to be an extremely unwise dispositive program, par-
ticularly when the beneficiary is not personally equipped to handle
a large distribution.
Both the American Law Institute and the Tax Section of the
reUnited States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941); Ryerson v. United States, 312
U. S. 405 (1941). The Supreme Court had laid the groundwork for this result
when it previously held that the beneficiary-and not the trustee-was the donee
to whom the exclusion applied. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U. S. 393 (1941).
"'Under prior law, this trust clearly would create "future interests." Cf.
Comm'r v. Glos, 123 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1941) (vested right and power of
appointment over accumulations).
m1 See note 111, supra.
110S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong. 2d Sess. 479 (1954).
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American Bar Association have recognized this underlying weakness
in Section 2503(c). The ALI has recently made a number of far-
reaching suggestions, one of which would permit the full exclusion
though the trust continued during the lifetime of the income benefi-
ciary.117 While the ALI approach seems consistent with the original
Congressional Committee Reports dealing with the future interest
problem,118 the ABA is not presently asking for that much leeway.
Instead, it would be satisfied if the trust could be continued up to io
years beyond the beneficiary's 21st birthday. 9
It is obvious that Section 2503 (c) as it exists today does not provide
a complete solution. On balance, a greater variety of more satisfactory
arrangements is available through Section 2503 (b). This provision
permits the creation of a trust with income to be paid to the minor
for his entire life, or for any shorter period. The corpus, in turn, may
be payable to the minor personally, to his estate, or to any other
person or organization designated by the donor. 20 In addition, the
trustee may be granted the discretion to invade corpus at any time
for the minor's benefit. With all of this, only a comparatively small
part of the gift will not qualify for the annual exclusion.
Under the Sensenbrenner-Fisher formula, 121 where a Section 25 o3 (b)
"ISee proposed Section Xioog(a)(i) and comments, Tentative Draft No. lo,
American Law Institute Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute io-li, 126-127
(April 3o, 1955).
"S. Rep. No. 655, 7 2d Cong. Ist Sess. 41 (1932); HR. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong.
ist Sess. 29 (1932).
"'See Recommendation V of Report of Committee on Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, American Bar Association Section of Taxation, 1955 Program and Com-
mittee Reports to be Presented at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting 22-25 (1955).
"'From an estate tax standpoint, some draftsmen of inter vivos trusts are not
completely comfortable under IRC § 2037 unless there is provision for the ultimate
remainder to pass to a charity. Cf. Trachtman, Estate Planning (1955) 143. This may
be accomplished in an IRC § 2503(b) trust, but not in one seeking to qualify under
IRC § 2503(c)- See notes 61-64, supra. However, IRC § 2037 has no applicability
unless both of two conditions are met: "(i) possession or enjoyment of the property
can, through ownership of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the dece-
dent," and "(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property ....
and the value of such reversionary interest ... exceeds 5 per cent of the value of
such property" [italics supplied]. In short, a mere reversionary interest in excess
of 5 per cent in value will not result in estate taxation provided that possession
or enjoyment of the property may be obtained without surviving the decedent.
See Comm'r v. Marshall's Estate, 203 F. (2d) 534 (C. A. 3 rd, 1953) ("necessary sur-
vivorship test for includability" not satisfied); Dicus, Some Implications of the
1954 Code For Estate Planning (1954) 32 Taxes 938, 94o. While a grantor or an
IRC § 2503(c) or IRC § 25o3 (b) trust may thus not be subject to estate taxation
under IRC § 2037 as to the value of the entire corpus, he will be taxable under
IRC § 2033 to the extent of the value of the possibility of his receiving a reversion-
ary interest. As to other estate tax considerations, see note 71, supra, and references
therein.
"'See notes 84-88, supra.
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trust provides for income to be paid or applied for a minor during his
life, the "present interest" value of gifts made during minority-com-
puted under the current actuarial tables-will average more than
8o per cent of the actual value of the gift properties. 22 In other words,
annual gifts to such a trust of $3,75o will produce an average annual
exclusion of $3,000, or, with gift-splitting, $7,5oo of gifts will produce
taxable gifts of only $1,500.
A gift tax return will have to be filed for that portion of the gift
constituting a future interest; 23 and practical difficulties may arise
in the handling of the funds required to be distributed. 24 However,
the problems are not insurmountable, and are well worth undertaking
when balanced against the flexibility made possible by such a trust in
the ultimate disposition of gift properties.
r=See Table I, following Reg. io8 § 86.1 9 (f). The applicable figure in column
2 of Table I should be multiplied by 31/2 per cent to determine the present value
of the right to receive the income for life from a $i.oo gift made at the particular
age specified in column i. Cf. Rogers, Some Practical Considerations in Gifts to
Minors (1951) 2o Ford. L. Rev. 33, 265-270 (75 per cent average during minority
under old tables). Under IRC § 25 03(b), a power of invasion in favor of the income
beneficiary is apparently to be disregarded in making this computation. See note
102, supra.
'LCf. Reg. so8 § 86.11.
'-lIncome taxation will result if any of the funds are used during minority to
discharge the grantor's legal obligations of support. See notes 32-33, supra. The use
of trust income to pay for the minor's college education might, as a matter of
local law, fall within the scope of such legal obligations. Cf. Mr. Justice Minton's
opinion as a Circuit Judge in Helfrich's Estate v. Comm'r, 143 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 7th,
i944) (estate tax). On the other hand, if trust income is not used on behalf of the
minor, practical problems will arise as to means for investing the funds distributed
under the terms of the instrument. The use of a "power in trust"-permitting the
trustee to retain and reinvest this income during the beneficiary's minority-might
well result in the trust being considered a discretionary accumulation trust. See
notes IoB -11, supra.
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